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“The evil that men do lives after them.” 
William Shakespeare
The September  11  2001  terrorist  attacks are 
an  example of evil that  has lived on,  echoed 
in  atrocious acts of violence against  ordinary 
people around the globe over  the last  ten 
years,  most  recently, in  Oslo. Most  Americans 
remember  9/11  as an  exceptional  event, a 
contemporary  equivalent  to the Japanese 
attack  on  Pearl Harbor. From  a  psychological 
perspective, however,  many  aspects of the 
public’s response to 9/11  followed a  pattern 
quite  familiar  to students of group dynamics 
and inter-group relations,  a  pattern  that 
warrants the close attention of leaders at all 
levels because it  reveals an  opportunity-
bubble – a  promising,  yet f leeting, 
opportunity  to shape the course of 
subsequent  events.  In  order  for  leaders to 
take advantage of this opportunity-bubble in 
a  timely  and effective manner, they  must  first 
understand it. By  studying the group and 
intergroup dynamics that  follow  tragedies, 
leaders can  lead in  such  a  way  as to ensure 
the opportunity-bubble leads to constructive 
rather than destructive outcomes.
One of the most  robust  and pervasive 
trends in  social behavior  is the  relationship 
between  perceived in-group threat  and group 
cohesion.1  Both  experimental evidence and 
historical case studies demonstrate this 
relationship:2  when  individuals perceive a 
serious threat  to the in-group (such as from 
an  enemy  attack or  natural  disaster), they 
show  greater solidarity  with  other  group 
members and increase their  support  for  the 
group leader. “Showing greater  solidarity” 
can  mean making enormous sacrifices in 
order  to support the in-group,  and standing 
firmly  behind the leader  even when mistakes 
are seen  to be made in leadership decision 
making. It  can  also mean demonstrating 
extraordinary  resilience in  the face of 
pressures and difficulties.  Thus,  examples of 
the kind of “Dunkirk spirit”  the British  public 
displayed during  the London  Blitz bombings 
in  World War  II often  occur during  wars, 
crises, and disasters.  
Judging  correctly  when  and how  to make 
constructive use of the opportunity-bubble 
after  a tragedy  is a  hallmark  of great 
leadership.  Enormous potential  for  civic 
generosity  and sacrifice is available at  the 
height  of an  opportunity-bubble,  but  leaders 
must  choose the kinds of sacrifices and the 
timing of calls to action carefully.  Timing  is of 
the greatest  importance: too early, and 
people – still  reeling  from  the impact  of the 
tragedy  – may  be unable to respond; too late, 
and people may  have grown too detached 
from  the tragedy  and accustomed to non-
commitment; even  later, people (and the 
media) may  focus critically  – and perhaps 
angrily  – on leadership’s failure to have asked 
for more. 
We argue that although  great  crisis will 
inevitably  invite consideration  of many 
alternatives, leadership must  pay  special 
attention  to opportunities to engage the 
public as capable partners  in  their  country’s 
response to the crisis – calling upon them  as 
citizens with  civic duties, as well  as rights. 
Such  opportunities will often entail 
significant sacrifice,  which we believe will 
generally  be accepted if the public’s role is 
clearly  explained and accompanied by  ample 
means to readily  acquire information  about 
t h e c r i s i s ,  f u t u r e t h r e a t s , a n d t h e 
government’s response.
Undoubtedly,  in  the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11  Americans were ready  and willing  to 
make personal and collective sacrifices. Over 
the first three weeks following the attacks, the 
rate of volunteerism  increased more than  six 
s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n s a b o v e a v e r a g e 
throughout the nation. 3  Within  only  three 
months, charitable donations for  9/11  victims 
and their  families exceeded $1.5  billion. 4 An 
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extraordinary,  albeit brief,  increase in  social 
capital signaled the publics’ readiness for 
civic contribution. Public  trust and 
confidence in  government  reached a  thirty-
year  peak in  the first few  weeks following  the 
attacks.5  Support for  leadership was 
extraordinarily  high  and widespread. Even 
p r e s t i g i o u s ,  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  s k e p t i c a l 
newspapers – for  example, The New  York 
Times  and the Washington Post – were 
uncritically  supportive of leadership 
dec is ions a f ter  9/11 , inc luding  the 
momentous decisions to wage wars in  Iraq 
and Afghanistan,  according to retrospect 
scholarly  analysis. 6  Yet,  in as little as six 
months, the large majority  of Americans who 
in early  post-9/11  surveys had reported 
increased trust  in  government and had 
sought  greater  opportunities for  political and 
social engagement simply  vanished. 7  The 
opportunity-bubble had begun to burst.
This is not  to say  that  leadership had not 
called for  civic contributions. In  his first  State 
of the Union  Address after  9/11,  for  example, 
President  Bush  called on Americans, as a 
“responsible nation,” to commit “at  least  two 
years – 4,000  hours over the rest of your 
lifetime – to the service of your  neighbors 
and your nation”  and invited Americans to 
join the newly  created USA  Freedom  Corps, 
which  would “focus on three areas of need: 
responding  in case of crisis at home; 
rebuilding  our  communities; and extending 
American  compassion throughout  the 
world.” 8 Nevertheless, in  the years to follow, 
aside from  military  enlistment,  opportunities 
for  civic  engagement  associated directly  with 
the threat  of terror  seemed largely  confined 
to calls for  increased citizen  vigilance. 
Interviewed on  the eve of the Iraq War  troop 
surge, 9 President  Bush was asked why,  given 
the importance he often  stressed the war  on 
terror  represented for  the country’s future,  as 
well  as the disproportionate share the 
volunteer  military  and their  families had 
sacrificed relative to the rest  of the country, 
the president  had not  “asked more Americans 
and more American interests to sacrifice 
something,”  in  particular, sacrifices that 
would “muster  the support”  and would 
involve Americans “in  the struggle.” In 
response,  President Bush  referred to his 
earlier  call for  volunteerism  and his decision 
to establish  the Freedom  Corps and asserted 
that  he had strongly  opposed what  were 
apparently  the primary  potential  forms of 
sacrifice considered after  9/11: compulsory 
military service and tax increases.
American  history,  however,  provides many 
examples of quite effective alternatives to 
calls for  compulsory  public sacrifice. The 
decision  to meet  the enormous requirements 
of the World War  II war effort  by 
supplementing  taxes with  a  campaign  calling 
upon  citizens in  all income categories to 
make voluntary  contributions through  War 
Bonds is particularly  instructive.  The War 
Bond campaign was carefully  crafted to 
create an  emotionally  compelling sense of 
civic  duty  and public  partnership in  the war 
effort.  During  an  all-day  fundraising  radio 
broadcast  in 1943,  for  instance,  the popular 
singer and celebrity  Kate Smith  explained to 
her  fellow  citizens: “when  we buy  War  Bonds, 
we’re not  buying  tanks and guns and shells 
and planes. What  we’re doing  is buying our 
boys back … bringing them  home to us, safe 
and sound once again.”10  The call for 
voluntary  contributions through  War  Bond 
commitments generated $98.3  billion  by 
1945, representing  almost  half the then  Gross 
National Product.11
Our  own  data, utilizing a  nationally 
representative probability  sample of several 
thousand American  adults surveyed in  late 
2008, underscores the public's sustained 
desire for  and disappointment  in  the lack  of 
opportunities they  believed government 
offered to serve a  meaningful  role in the 
country's response to terrorism.12 Seven  years 
after  9/11, only  37  percent  of Americans 
adults reported that they  had ever  made 
sacrifices on behalf of the “war  on  terror.” 
While  Americans continued to engage in 
voluntary,  unpaid civic services (32  percent), 
only  a  few  (6  percent) reported participating 
in  volunteer activities directly  associated with 
crisis or  disaster  preparedness. A  slim 
majority  (52  percent) nevertheless indicated 
a  desire for  volunteer opportunities designed 
to prepare for  and respond to disasters or 
acts of terrorism.  Moreover,  nearly  two thirds 
of survey  respondents felt  that government 
had failed to provide or  clearly  explain  ways 
for average citizens to play  a  role or 
participate in  their  country’s defense against 
terrorism. Most  respondents (66  percent) 
indicated that government  had failed to 
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clearly  explain  citizens’ role in  the country’s 
fight  against  terrorism  and even more (74 
percent) that government  had failed to 
adequately  explain  how  to prepare for  acts of 
terror.
PREPARING FOR THE NEXT 
‘OPPORTUNITY-BUBBLE’
Although  social scientists have often  helped 
government  craft patriotically  appealing  and 
persuasive calls for  civic action during 
national crises in  patriotically  appealing and 
persuasive ways,  we do not  suggest  that  the 
results are inevitably  effective or  desirable. 
Political scientists contributed to the 
successful  WWII war  bond campaign.  In 
contrast,  similar  efforts by  the Federal Civil 
D e f e n s e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d t h e 
Psychological  Strategy  Board,  designed to 
engage the public in  the Cold War  civil 
defense movement, ultimately  backfired. 
Public  outrage and distrust  increased as the 
public's growing  appreciation  of the 
catastrophic  destructive capacity  of nuclear 
weapons emphatically  contradicted the threat 
minimization  and implied survivability 
underlying civil defense propaganda.13 
Our  main  goal in  this brief discussion  is to 
call  attention  to the opportunities and 
challenges ahead. Tragedies will happen, 
even  with the best  planning.  But  leadership 
can  take advantage of opportunity-bubbles to 
ensure that  citizens are effectively  engaged in 
constructive activities in  post-tragedy  eras. 
Thus, our  message is that it  is not enough  to 
plan  ahead to avert  tragedies; it is also 
essential to plan  ahead to take advantage of 
opportunity-bubbles when tragedies do come 
about.
The present  climate of suspicion  that 
p e r v a d e s p u b l i c a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d s 
g o v e r n m e n t  m i g h t w e l l u n d e r m i n e 
enthusiasm  for  such  planning,  as well  as 
confidence in  prospects for  capitalizing  on 
opportunities. Indeed, distrust  has long 
characterized public  attitudes towards 
government. Throughout the decade 
following  World War  II,  four  out  of five 
Americans reliably  claimed broad trust  and 
confidence in their  government; by  the 
millennium,  only  two in  five Americans made 
similar  claims.14 With  respect  to government 
institutions charged specifically  with 
homeland security  or  crisis management  and 
preparedness missions,  our  own  data  reveals 
a  parallel and troubling  lack of public trust 
and confidence.  Over  the years 2006  and 
2007, for  example, we observed that  between 
20 and 30 percent  of the public claimed 
“absolutely  no confidence”  in  the Department 
of Homeland Security  (DHS). By  December 
2008  an  even  greater  proportion  (30-46 
percent)  did not  trust DHS would be “open 
and honest with  the public,”  “provide what 
was needed when it  was needed,”  or  “do the 
right  thing”  in  the aftermath of a  terrorist 
attack  or  other  crisis – levels of distrust 
exceeded only  by  the public’s appraisals of 
FEMA.  To make matters worse,  popular 
literature has suggested that government has 
and will cynically  exploit  the publics' 
vulnerability  and suffering  inflicted by  the 
"shock" of disasters and other  crisis to enact 
highly unpopular political policies.15
On  the surface, these trends seem 
disheartening for  leadership,  because they 
seem  to suggest that citizens will not  be 
influenced by  leadership communications. 
However,  to understand why  this is not the 
case,  it is useful to remind ourselves of typical 
behavioral trends in  post-tragedy  situations. 
The vitally  important feature of opportunity-
bubbles is that, for  a  fleeting  period,  citizens 
cast aside their  doubts,  criticisms, distrust, 
and negative attitudes, and become ready  to 
sacrifice for  the group and strongly  support 
leadership.  Thus, although  the level  of public 
trust  in  authorities is generally  low  at 
present, we can  predict with  high  certainty 
that  there will be a  widespread readiness 
among  the public to make sacrifices for 
society during the next opportunity-bubble.
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